Constitutional Paideia :: Hegel Constitutionalism Papers

constitutional PaideiaConstitutional paideia designates a form of typographyalism that construes a nations constitution essentially in confiness of current processes of collective self-formation. This paper explores the notion of constitutional paideia as formulated by Hegel, who explicitly defines constitutionalism with categories of Bildung. The papers strategy is to present Hegel position in light of questions that can be raised about it. The paper advances trey of import theses (1) in spite (and perhaps because) of his historico-culturist approach to law, Hegel is a theoretician of constitutional paideia (2) despite construing constitutionalism in terms of ongoing processes of popular self-interpretation, Hegel does not vitiate the distinction between law and politics deemed so central to constitutional theory and (3) despite construing constitutionalism in terms of self-formative processes of a point culture, Hegel does not jettison the normativity and trans-contextualism long associated with modern constitutional theory. The paper concludes with just about observations on the contemporary significance of Hegelian constitutionalism. Constitutional paideia is a term I shall use to designate a form of constitutionalism that construes a nations constitution essentially in terms of ongoing processes of collective self-formation.(1) As such, it is markedly distinct from competing models. It is distinct from liberal models, notably represented today by John Rawls, for whom a constitution moldiness guarantee certain staple fibre political rights and liberties and establish democratic procedures for moderating the political rivalry, and for determining issues of kind policy.(2) While constitutional paideia is not chary of liberal concern for effective and moral constraints, it rejects the latters commitment to entrenched rights and a fixed sense of a nations legal-political identity. It is likewise distinct from communitarian models, represented however ambiguously by blackguard Michelman. While sharing with such models a focus on communal identity, its commitment to processes of self-formation renders constitutional inhospitable to a theory keyed to a set of preexisting cultural valuesthat more encompassing popular life, bearing the imprint of a common past.(3) Constitutional paideia is distinct save from republican models, represented equally ambiguously by Hannah Arendt. Although it shares with republicanism the notion that constitutionalism must be sensitive to principles of public virtue, collective power, and civic commitment to a shared enterprise, it places special emphasis on the conditions for constituting collective identity and nationhood itself.(4) Constitutional paideia is also distinct from deliberative models, represented notably by Jrgen Habermas, for whom the constitution establishes political procedures according to which citizens, in the exercise of their right to self-determination, successfully pursue the cooperative project of establishing just (or more just) conditions of life.